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Capital in the 21st Century: A Critique 
 
David Soskice, LSE12 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Going back to the C18th and providing fascinating detail for the whole of the C20th and into the 
C21st, Piketty sets out a remarkable collection of statistics of wealth relative to national income 
for a number of major countries, as well as associated rates of return.  This is supplemented by 
the equally gripping data on top incomes in the last century or so3. From the extraordinarily 
inegalitarian world of the Belle Epoque, he shows the very large shift in an egalitarian direction 
from WW1 to the 1970s. But he also argues that this shift was substantially reversed in most 
advanced economies in recent decades. Based on the analytic framework he develops to analyse 
these changes, he projects major and very striking increases in the wealth income ratio in the 
rest of the current century.  It is presumably to this that the title, Capital in the 21st Century, 
makes reference; and to the associated inequality, r > g, his ‘central contradiction of capitalism’, 
that accounts for the extraordinary success of the book. It is one of the most compelling and 
powerful books I have read in a long time, lucidly and easily written and exceptionally 
interesting. While I am critical here of Piketty’s parsimonious and mechanical model of the 
dynamics of capitalist system as it explains the growth of inequality in recent decades, the 
experience of reading the whole book cannot help but to move.  
I focus in this review essay on the period from the 1970s to the present, and on the longer-term 
predictions of developments in the C21st that Piketty makes.  I focus in particular on his 
explanation of the reversal over the past four decades of the more egalitarian thirty year  
postwar period from the mid-1940s, the trentes glorieuses.  From the 1970s on inequality has 
visibly and uncomfortably increased along a range of dimensions in the advanced world; and, as 
the title suggests, the book speaks to a deep contemporary unease.4  Thus it seems not 
inappropriate to focus on what I will call the great reversal.  
I want to make two main points in this essay.  
(1)  The analytic base of the book is a parsimonious mathematical argument, built up from 
Piketty’s three fundamental laws of capitalism, which purports to explain the historical 
dynamics of capitalism. I will suggest that this argument is misleading analytically and 
empirically as far as the explanation of the great reversal since the 1970s is concerned.  (But let 
                                                             
1 School Professor of Political Science and Economics, Government Dept., LSE 
2 I would like to thank Philippe Aghion, Cathy Boone, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Niki Lacey for very helpful 
suggestions; and Wendy Carlin and Torben Iversen on joint work on the ideas in sections 2 and 3. 
3 The data is part of the extraordinary collection amassed by the team led by Atkinson, Piketty and Saez.   
4 Clearly the financial crisis and its prolonged problematic aftermath is a major part of that unease, but I 
focus (as does Piketty) on the reversal of the relatively egalitarian postwar decades.   
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me be clear: the great value of the book does not depend on this model – even though the 
simplicity of the model is itself a major achievement.)    
How does the argument work? Piketty’s key analytic variable is the ratio of capital to output – 
hence the first word of the title of the book, Capital. It is the height of this ratio in a particular 
country (which he labels β) which is Piketty’s summary measure of that country’s inequality.  
It is worth saying that the reader may be initially confused by wealth being composed of 
property and industrial and financial capital, and in describing capital Piketty uses wealth 
(including property) and capital interchangeably. But in his modelling (which draws on the 
framework of Solow’s famous growth model (ref)) Piketty confines the definition to capital used 
in production of goods and services.  It is Piketty’s interpretation in his modelling which I use in 
this critique of his model.  
His simple  apparatus for understanding changes in β, the capital to output ratio, is based on his 
three fundamental laws, consisting of two equations and an inequality, the latter the now 
famous r > g. In this inequality, r is the rate of return on capital or wealth and g the growth of 
output. Piketty establishes that over very long periods of time r is between 4% and 6% and g is 
much lower. This empirical inequality, that r > g, (significantly greater than g) is his central 
contradiction of capitalism.  It is worth emphasizing that these three relations form the core of 
his argument: although evidently political economic institutions change they are not part of the 
argument. Put intuitively to explain the dynamics of long-term capitalism: A high rate of return 
r on capital gives capitalists the resources to accumulate further capital. So with a high r and a 
low g, the growth of capital will be high (reflecting the high r) relative to the low growth of 
output g. Hence β, the capital to output ratio and measure of inequality, will inexorably rise.  
But these long periods of rising values of β are brought to sudden ends by wars or long 
recessions (or, post-1945, social democratic governments) which destroy capital. Thus the long 
period of rising capital which led to the high water mark of inequality in the Belle Epoque in the 
first decade of the C20th. Then followed the collapse of β in the destruction of wealth from 1914 
to 1945; and then by the egalitarian parenthesis of the Trentes Glorieuses from the mid 1940s to 
the mid 1970s when r and g were not far apart, because growth was abnormally relatively high. 
In Piketty’s parsimonious perspective, the reversal of inequality – the very great rise of β back to 
early C20th levels –  was the mechanical consequence of the move back to the long-run 
empirical regularity of r > g, as a result of the secular fall in g from the 1970s on.  
In his model, decisions on capital accumulation are made by savers (existing wealth holders 
reinvesting their r returns).  In Piketty’s simplest saver-dominated version,  the growth of 
capital – call it gK – is equal to r; hence Kr g g  directly implies his increasing capital to 
output ratio, β.  Businesses are hardly independent actors: but necessary for Piketty’s saver-
dominated mechanism to work is the standard neo-classical assumption that companies will 
invest in capital equipment the amount that savers (in the simple case above capitalists saving 
the returns to their wealth) decide to save at full (or equilibrium) employment.  
But this is implausible: For it is businesses which actually make investment decisions about 
capital equipment, not savers. And it is counter-intuitive that in a period of slow and uncertain 
growth businesses would be choosing to increase investment and the growth of capital to ramp 
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up inexorably their capital to output ratios. A business-dominated version in the period from the 
1970s to at least the mid-1990s of slow growth and substantial uncertainty is likely one in which 
businesses make investment decisions on the basis of expected growth – in a very simple version 
suggesting 
Kg g implying zero growth in β. I discuss this in section 3.  
That it is counter-intuitive is reinforced by two recent contributions by economists which argue 
that there was in fact no increase in the capital to output ratio if ‘capital’ is the capital employed 
in business (in terms of which Piketty explains the reversal of equality); instead the significant 
rise in wealth which occurred was in property, and largely reflects house price inflation (Bonnet, 
Bono et al. 2014, Rowthorn 2014).  
(2) My major problem with Piketty’s analysis of the whole period from the end of the 2nd World 
War to the present is quite different.  His analysis rests wholly on a simple parsimonious 
mechanical model.  There is no political economic framework to understand the complex history 
of the egalitarian postwar decades, major shifts in technological regimes from Fordism to the 
ICT revolution, and the role of politics in advanced democracies.5  Despite his plea for a ‘political 
and historical economics’, it plays no part in his model. 
He asks for ‘a political and historical economics’, and sees ‘economics as a subdiscipline of the 
social sciences, alongside history, sociology, anthropology, and political science’ (Kindle loc 
10144-5). ‘For far too long economists have sought to define themselves in terms of their 
supposedly scientific methods. In fact, those methods rely on an immoderate use of 
mathematical models, which are frequently no more than an excuse for occupying the terrain 
and masking the vacuity of the content’ (Kindle loc 10159-61). These are sentiments with which I 
agree.  Moreover he provides delightful and well-chosen quotations from Jane Austen and 
Balzac. But his core analysis, especially of recent decades, is straightforwardly based on 
relatively standard neoclassical mathematical models. 
Thus Piketty makes virtually no substantive reference to the massive technological 
developments of recent decades, to the political decisions – often conflictual – which enabled 
them to be carried through, including allowing capital mobility and financial liberalisation; he 
seems to argue that the capture of democracy by capitalism is at the root of the growth of 
inequality yet does not ask why decisive (middle-class) voters in most (but not all) well-
functioning democracies have been opposed to redistribution to compensate the losers of the 
shift from Fordism to knowledge economies.  In section 3 I sketch a brief political economic 
framework of the second half of the Twentieth Century, and the role of democratic politics in 
‘institutionalising’ technological change, to provide a story of how interests get formed by 
external changes and how consequentially conflicting interests get resolved by political 
institutions. 
(2a)  I have two further related subsidiary issues with Piketty’s analysis of the great reversal, 
which I tie into the political economic framework in section 3:  While Piketty’s fundamental 
focus is on wealth/capital and on top incomes, the main concern of many students of 
                                                             
5 Jean-Luc Gaffard makes a similar set of points: Gaffard, J.-L. (2014). "Le capital au XXIe siècle: un livre 
défi pour l’analyse." OFCE, Les Notes 40(2). 
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contemporary inequality is poverty and low incomes, which have risen substantially since the 
postwar decades.  Yet Piketty more or less neglects poverty. Apart from a short section on 
minimum wages, Piketty appears almost indifferent to the bottom end of the income 
distribution. His illustrative income distributions break income earners into top 10%, middle 
40%, bottom 50% - thus excluding poverty by definition as an independent category. Of 17 
references to poverty in the advanced world in the entire book, arguably only three relate to 
post-1914 and one to the present. 
(2b)  Contemporary inequality consists of more than the high capital to output ratio β (assuming 
it is in fact high).  Inequality has risen over the whole period on a range of dimensions (OECD, 
Atkinson), including top incomes and also poverty and low incomes. Yet all that Piketty explains 
in his model encapsulating the three fundamental laws of capitalism is the high value of the 
single variable β, the capital to output ratio.   
So is the reader meant to infer some sort of reductionist quasi-Marxist position that a high 
capital to output ratio gives capital political power, with the latter allowing the development of a 
range of other inequalities without compensatory democratic political responses? In developing 
a political economic analysis, I argue that such a position is difficult to sustain. For Piketty this 
seems a key question, but the parsimony of his model and the absence from it  of a political 
economic framework in which politics plays an important role, leaves us without an answer. 
 
 
2. Piketty’s Model of Accumulation: the Capital to Income Ratio, β 
 
In sub-sections 2.1 and 2.2 in this section, I set out Piketty’s model for explaining β, the capital 
to output ratio – combining his second and third fundamental laws.  This is purely for readers 
who want a bit more background than Piketty himself provides; and they may want to consult 
chapters 3 and 8 of a recent text on modern macroeconomics by Carlin and Soskice (Carlin and 
Soskice 2014).  I develop a simple critique of his explanation of the increase in β from the 1970s 
to the present in 2.3, in fact suggesting that we should not expect the period of low growth and 
uncertainty to imply such an increase. And in 2.4 I set out evidence from different very recent 
studies by economists that in fact no increase in β did occur.  In 2.5 this is related to 
independent critiques by Rowthorn (Rowthorn 2014) and Rognlie (Rognlie 2014) of Piketty’s 
argument as to why the rise in β over recent decades explains a corresponding rise in a, the 
share of profits in output, his first fundamental law.  
2.1   Piketty assumes that the ratio of capital (business capital) to income (or output or GDP), 
which Piketty calls β, rose substantially from the end of the 1960s to the present6. How does he 
explain this increase? If K is capital and Y national income, then β is defined as follows: 
/K Y    
                                                             
6 Although as will be shown in 2.4 this is probably empirically incorrect as an assumption. 
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In his modelling of accumulation, Piketty has in mind an economist’s view of the relation 
between capital and output which derives from growth theory: namely, output is produced by 
means of capital (think machines) and labour.  (One reason why it is not always easy to follow 
Piketty’s logic is that he switches between wealth as conceived of as capital used in production – 
which we will refer to as K, and wealth conceived of as the sum of K and the stock of housing.  In 
this section we equate wealth with K.)  
Why does Piketty argue that β increases? Piketty’s argument is set out on a step-by-step basis to 
underline its mechanical nature. Leaving aside depreciation, the growth rate of the capital stock 
is /K K where K I  , the level of investment. Hence, if the growth rate of national income is 
called g, then /K Y   increases when / /I K K K g   , that is the growth rate of the capital 
stock is greater than the growth rate of output.  
Next assume that savings is equal to investment. Savings and investment decisions are made by 
different agents, savings typically by households and investment decisions (how much capital 
equipment to buy) by companies. Exactly how they are brought into equality is at the heart of 
differences between neo-classical and Keynesian approaches, especially in an era of slow output 
growth as Piketty describes the environment of recent decades and that to come in future 
decades.  Piketty takes the standard neo-classical position here that  I = S unproblematically.  
Also in line with Solow’s growth model Piketty assumes that households decide how much to 
save by reference to a simple rule (ref solow).  This rule is that households save a fixed 
proportion of their income, so that if Y is total income total savings S is given by: 
S sY   
where s is the proportion of income saved. Hence  
I S I sY     
And dividing both sides of the equation by the capital stock K, it can be seen that  
I Y
s
K K
   so that 
I s
K 
   since 
K
Y
    
Now imagine the economy is in the postwar decades with a high rate of growth of both capital 
and output; imagine they are both growing at 5%, so that β is stable; if it is further assumed that 
s is 10%, then β will be 2. (5% = 10%/2).  
Next take the decades from the 1970s on and assume that g, the growth of output, has now fallen 
to 2%. Here is how Piketty argues that β will gradually but inexorably rise (assuming s stays 
constant at 10%):  
When the period of low growth starts in the 1970s, β is initially 2, and /I K is initially 5%. Since 
g is now 2%, capital is growing initially 3% faster than output so that β, the ratio of capital to 
output will be slowly but steadily rising.  / /I K s   so that /I K  will be falling slowly over 
time as β rises.  When /I K  has eventually (over a long period of time) fallen to 2%, so that the 
rates of capital and output growth are again equal, β will be equal to 5, since 2% = 10%/5.   
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The equation showing the relation in equilibrium between β and g is given by: 
/g s   (or /s g  )  
and this is Piketty’s Second Fundamental Law of Capitalism. It must hold over the longer term 
if s and g are constant. Thus Piketty’s basic argument is that it is the fall in g from the high 
growth rates of the post-war decades to the much lower growth rates of recent decades which is 
then responsible for the growth of β between the end of the 1960s and the present.  
2.2  This argument requires that s is constant: households save a constant proportion of their 
income. How reasonable is this constancy of s?  
Piketty switches between the view that savings is well modelled by S sY  with s constant, to a 
savings function which goes back to Pasinetti.  Pasinetti proposed that capitalists saved their full 
return on capital while workers consumed all that they earned.  In the Pasinetti case, S rK . 
This radically simplifies Piketty’s task: for now, if I S and S rK , the growth of capital 
/ /I K rK K r  , so the condition for β increasing, that the growth of capital is greater than the 
growth of output is now simply 
r g  
Piketty’s Third Fundamental Law of Capitalism is that r g is an empirical regularity over 
prolonged periods of history.   
He also calls the inequality the ‘central contradiction of capitalism’.  If r > g is taken by itself, to 
call the inequality the central contradiction of capitalism is puzzling: for r > g is perfectly 
consistent with the 2nd Fundamental Law, the standard neo-classical growth equation that 
/g s  , as well as other standard stability conditions.7   
r > g becomes the central contradiction when it is combined with S = rK. For then the growth of 
capital / /S K I K r  , and r > g then implies that β is necessarily increasing in his model. 
Does β stabilize in the long-run as was the case with S sY when / ?s g   Or does β just go 
on growing? Piketty shows that convergence will eventually occur, but it will take a very long 
time and will imply a very high level of β. In effect he is saying: if g is low then the equilibrium 
value of β in the long run will be so high that a realistic analysis implies a continuously rising β. 
For example, using the Cobb-Douglas production function as he does, and assuming realistically 
that the share of capital in output is 30%, the condition for convergence is .3 /g   so that a 
2% growth rate of output implies that β = 15.  
To all intents and purposes, r > g and S = rK, during a prolonged period of low growth, implies a 
continuously rising β.  Piketty thus invites us to a much broader and grander theory of the 
evolution of capitalism, and with it an apocalyptic view of the longer stretch of the C21st.  It is 
                                                             
7 In fact r > g is a central stability condition in economics. For example, the present value of a stream of 
profits from an investment growing at rate g and discounted at rate r is finite only if r > g. With the 
standard neo-classical growth model /s g  and the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function r > g when α > s, where α is the share of profits in output (normally between 25% and 35%) and 
s, the savings ratio, between 5% and 15% - so almost always satisfied. 
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now clear why r g has become the famous and quite intuitive inequality associated with 
Piketty. Students in Cambridge Mass can be seen with this inequality on their T-shirts. 
Piketty’s grand theory of capitalism is then something like this: Historically, r has over long 
periods of time been between 4% and 6%. But g, the growth of output (the growth of the labour 
force plus technical progress), has almost always been much lower. Thus over long periods of 
time β rises, continually increasing the level of capital relative to output. Then, periodically, 
there is a significant destruction of capital, often associated with wars, and most significantly in 
the period from 1914 to 1945; and very rarely there are periods of high growth such as that from 
1945 to the mid 1970s, the Trentes Glorieuses, which damp down the (inevitable eventual) 
operation of .r g  But then r > g comes into operation to again, over time, produce high values 
of β. In looking to the next several decades, Piketty sees little to relief his concern for a future 
driven by r > g, unless it be major conflict. Not an unimpressive theory of capitalism! 
Yet it should be clear that it is the combination of r > g with the savings rule S rK – as well a 
mechanism to ensure that I = S – which generates Piketty’s very strong results for the future.  
Thus, much hangs on this combination of assumptions. 
2.3  I argue here on analytic grounds – summarized at the start of this review – that Piketty’s 
central r > g model, explaining the rise in β,  does not appear plausible for the period from the 
1970s to the present.  Importantly for this sub-section I cite recent work in 2.4 below showing 
that β does not seem to have increased empirically, which is what my amended model here of 
Piketty predicts. 
So: Given both r > g and the very significant secular decline in g since the 1970s, why didn’t β 
increase? Piketty uses two related models as we saw in the last section. The difference between 
them lay in the modelling of savings behavior, that savings is either proportional to income, 
S sY or S rK . Both imply that a fall in g (or a rise in r) leads to a rise in β, and the key 
mechanisms are, for our purposes, similar. So take the S rK version which leads intuitively to 
the argument that r > g implies that β is increasing. Explaining the intuition puts the finger on 
the key neo-classical assumption, namely that .I S  The simple intuition is then: if 
/ .I S I rK I K r      The growth rate of capital is equal to r, so if the growth rate of 
output g is less than r, then β, the ratio of capital to output, must be increasing. This can be 
thought of as a savings-dominated approach to capital accumulation: that the latter reflects 
savings decisions that S = rK.   
Decisions about I and S are (normally) taken by different agents: companies decide on how 
much they want to invest in capital equipment (I) and households (in this case wealthy 
households) decide how much they want to save (S). The (on the surface simple) assumption 
that I S , that companies decide to invest the amount which households decide they want to 
save, requires a bit of sleight of hand in the neo-classical growth models. It was assumed that 
companies operated under conditions of perfect competition, so that they did not have problems 
of selling what they produced: their concern was that r, the marginal product of capital, fell by 
exactly the amount needed to make it profitable for then to invest the amount households 
wished to save at the new value of r. The neo-classical assumption was then that capital markets 
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(or the monetary authorities) would ensure the requisite fall in r. In practice this has never been 
an important issue in growth theory in part because growth theorists have ben interested in 
other problems: Piketty’s adoption of a saver-dominated view of capital accumulation is 
therefore perfectly in line with neo-classical growth theory.8 
However, businesses operate under conditions of imperfect competition and there is still much  
controversy on the determinants of business investment during periods of low growth and 
uncertainty, as has characterized recent decades. So a major element is that expectations of 
future market growth for the products of the individual company are of key importance (given 
also that the return to investment is above the real cost of borrowing).  Companies appear highly 
sensitive to the general economic climate of optimism and pessimism. In this broader and more 
pragmatic perspective, the general climate of recent decades has not been propitious for the type 
of automatic adjustment implied by Piketty’s model. 
A highly simplified alternative to capital accumulation being saver dominated, S I rK  , with 
investment coming into line with savings, would be to assume that companies determine 
investment which responds to the growth rate of markets, g: hence  
I gK  
This is in fact the Harrodian-Keynesian accelerator theory of investment (rewritten it is simply 
Y
I gK K Y
Y


    ).9  It of course directly implies (as it is designed to bring out the 
underlying structure of my take on Piketty’s position) that β is precisely constant. 
If households choose how much to save, how might that be brought into line with the 
investment decisions of companies. In modern macroeconomics the central bank targets 
inflation with the instrument of the so-called policy real interest rate (see chs 3 and 6 of Carlin 
and Soskice (Carlin and Soskice 2014)). In principle if the central bank can alter r then (in this 
very simplified model) all the central bank needs do is to set r = g, for then .S rK gK I     
In practice the central bank’s policy operates largely on consumer durables including housing, 
as well as to a much smaller extent on investment.  Moreover central bank inflation-targetting 
only developed in the 1980s. The general point to make is that, if investment decisions are 
business-dominated and concerned with confidence in the growth of product markets, aggregate 
demand management is generally going to be more effective in keeping the economy in 
equilibrium by operating on consumption/savings rather than on investment.  
The model is of course highly simplified and is meant as an illustration of how the problems of 
Piketty’s argument can be avoided.  
                                                             
8 Specifically, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, the desired stock of capital is given by the 
condition that the marginal product of capital is equal to the rate of return: /K Y r . Perfectly 
adjusting investment is then equal to ( )rK g g where rg  is the % change in r 
9 This of course has much in common with both Joan Robinson and Harrod’s position in the 1950s, 
though I tie this into a modern macroeconomics approach. 
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2.4 Reassessing Piketty’s data on β.  In a very recent and detailed statistical paper, a team of 
economists at LIEPP, Sciences Po, Odran Bonnet, Pierre-Henri Bono, Etienne Chapelle and 
Guillaume Wasmer, argue that Piketty is wrong in his presentation of data on β for the period at 
least from the 1970s to the present, the period of the reversal of equality on which this review 
focusses (Bonnet, Bono et al. 2014).  What they show is that the increase in β over that period is 
largely an increase in wealth in property, rather than business capital in the sense in which 
Piketty uses capital in his r > g model.  Moreover they show that the increase in wealth largely 
takes the form of increases in house prices. Bob Rowthorn also comes to an identical conclusion 
in another recent article, to which I refer just below in 2.5 (Rowthorn 2014).  
2.5 Piketty’s First Fundamental Law. Piketty’s first fundamental law (in fact just a definition) 
defines α, the share of profits in output, by /rK Y r   . Piketty then argues that as β rises 
so will α, thus using the rise in β to explain a second increase in inequality, namely the share in 
profits in output.  One step is necessary in the argument: As β, the capital to output ratio,  rises 
so microeconomics generally implies that r, the rate of profit, falls. So to make his argument 
Piketty needs to assume that a 1% rise in β is likely to imply a less than 1% fall in r.  This 
requirement (technically that the elasticity of substitution in the production function is greater 
than one – ie a relatively large change in β is the consequence of a given change in α) is asserted 
by Piketty to be econometrically the case.  
The value of the elasticity of substitution (usually written σ) is very far from an uncontentious 
subject in contemporary economics. Until a decade or so ago, there had been a broad consensus, 
especially for the US economy, that σ = 1 (the Cobb-Douglas case).  Since then a spate of articles 
has argued that, properly estimated, its value is less than one (Klump, 2007a, 2007b; Antras 
2004) (Chirinko 2008); the argument in any case has largely been between σ = 1 and σ < 1.   
 
In his powerful critique, Rowthorn reinforces the position that the elasticity of substitution is 
less than one, while independently reiterating Bonnet et al’s statistical conclusion to which this 
paper has already referred (Bonnet, Bono et al. 2014). As Rowthorn says: 
Piketty's assumption regarding the elasticity of substitution is not correct. There is 
considerable evidence that this elasticity is less than unity. Moreover, Piketty's method 
for measuring changes in the capital-output ratio is misleading. He fails to allow for the 
disproportionate increase in the market value of certain real assets, especially housing, in 
recent decades. This leads him to conclude, mistakenly, that the capital-output ratio has 
risen by a considerable amount. In fact, conventional measures of this ratio indicate that 
it has been either stationary or has fallen in most advanced economies during the period 
in question. This would suggest that the basic problem is not the over-accumulation of 
capital, but just the opposite. There has been too little real investment. 
Thus Rowthorn reiterates from a different perspective the analytic conclusion to which I came in 
2.3. 
    
  
3. The Absent Role of Political Economy and Technological Change 
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3.1  A comparative political economic framework is in my view necessary to assess Piketty’s most 
substantive claim that contemporary inequality is driven by the reappearance of capital.    
Piketty does not have a serious comparative political economic framework. He has for example a 
quite trivial explanation of why the rise in top incomes is confined to the Anglo-Saxon 
economies:   
I noted that the “conservative revolution” that gripped the US and GB in the 1970s and 
1980s and that led to among other things greater tolerance of very high executive pay 
was probably due to a feeling that these countries were being overtaken by others. … 
Obviously, however, other factors also played an important role.  (Locn 5773). 
It is possible that I have missed key references in Capital and I have certainly not gone through 
the online resources which Piketty provides. But my impression is that the book lacks coherent 
foundations in comparative political economy. 
 Let me sketch in a few paragraphs recent work in comparative political economy which 
integrates technological change with political economy and which bears on the increase in 
various dimensions of inequality between the 1970s and the present.10 Fordism operated 
somewhat differently across the advanced economies, but three elements produced low 
unemployment and wage compression. There was a huge backlog of basic demand for autos and 
white goods which drove aggregate demand until the 1970s (with rather minimal help from 
Keynesian demand management); it was easy to integrate those with low education and social 
skills into semi-skilled employment – in Western Europe about two-thirds of young people in 
the 1960s left school at 15 or 16; and, given complementarities in production between skilled 
and semi-skilled labour, collective bargaining led to compression of wage differentials between 
skilled and semi-skilled.   
Fordism gradually collapsed through the 1970s and 1980s as a competitive technology under the 
growing impact of the IT revolution in open world markets. Governments accepted trade 
openness and other measures of liberalisation – as decisive voters wanted access to the more 
varied, sophisticated and higher quality products which the integration of ICT into production 
was increasingly making available: far from capital suborning democracy, there was in fact 
vociferous opposition to the Thatcher government from the CBI in the early 1980s for exposing 
business to market competition.   
IT puts gives greater decision-making power to the individual employee, the effectiveness of 
which depends on his or her analytic skills; it also depends on social skills because employees 
now have to interact to a greater degree in taking decisions; at the same time, the return to 
physical power is correspondingly reduced. This has led to a large increase in the returns to 
education; and a corresponding, and very much continuing, increase in staying on rates in 
secondary and tertiary education (Oesch 2013).  Thus a straightforward explanation for the low 
incomes and high unemployment rates of those who do leave school early, frequently those 
without social skills or cultural capital, is that the jobs they have access to are low paid and 
                                                             
10 This section owes a great deal to ongoing collaboration with Torben Iversen. 
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without prospects – the consequence of technological change and democratic trade-openness 
strategies. 
An analysis of democratic political institutions can take us further: The ability of children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds to benefit from the public educational system and avoid poverty 
thus reflects the system’s efficacy and reach. By and large this is more limited in liberal market 
economies with majoritarian electoral systems, where dominant middle class voters want the 
bulk of educational resources. It is particularly the case in the US where decisions on the 
distribution of public educational expenditure are largely taken locally, de facto by middle class 
home owners who can switch resources away from poor blacks. Hence poverty is higher in 
majoritarian systems (liberal market economies) than under PR (coordinated market 
economies); and significantly higher in the US with decentralized majoritarian decision-making 
in education (as well as residential zoning).   
For those who do lose out, political systems have not been generous in redistribution. Again this 
is a standard democratic response in the advanced countries, augmented by the effect of the IT 
revolution in increasing educational levels of the large majority, thus more sharply 
differentiating their interests from the low-skilled minority. This is most notably the case in 
majoritarian systems, which tend to have slightly right of centre governments on average 
(Iversen and Soskice 2006). But it is also true of PR systems on the continent (Esping-
Andersen’s Christian Democratic welfare states with high insurance and low redistribution), 
where CD parties with just left of centre, centrist and just right of centre components for 
coalitions with centrist parties. Only in Scandinavian countries with paradoxically strong right 
parties are the interests of the low-skilled included in coalitions between centrist and left parties 
(Iversen and Soskice 2014). Again, to summarise, the general limits to redistribution via the 
political system are the result of democratic decision-making, not the effect of capital. 
Is there a direct sense in which the political power of capital has increased in recent decades, 
(which I take to be Piketty’s proposition)? This is certainly a widely held view, often seen as 
associated with globalisation and financialisation, and perhaps one which has made many 
readers instinctively sympathetic to Piketty.  
Clearly, ‘money speaks’ in American politics. But that has always been the case due to two 
interrelated aspects of American politics, which are reproduced nowhere else: that members of 
Congress can have individual effects on legislation, and that American parties are not highly 
disciplined as a result of the primary system. Thus large companies have always ‘invested’ in 
members of Congress. This was as true in the 1950s as at present. (What has changed – due to 
the collapse of Fordism – is the diminished role of unions and the dramatically changed 
structure of companies.) 
The ICT revolution has had two major consequences for advanced capitalist companies in the 
advanced economies, both associated with globalisation and both of which have paradoxically 
clipped their political wings. First the ICT revolution combined with globalisation has hugely 
increased market competition between advanced capitalist companies in both goods and 
services: innovation is now central to competition, as is product variety, sophistication and 
quality.  Whether or not groups of advanced companies could ever take collective action to make 
credible threats against advanced governments (outside explicit policy areas under coordinated 
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capitalism), their ability is now much lower.  The second point concerns the nature of MNE 
location decisions in other advanced economies: whatever their activity in other economies, 
knowledge-based MNEs do not behave like footloose capitalists in the advanced world; very 
generally they are concerned to invest in co-locations, setting up subsidiaries or buying into or 
building relations with companies, defined by pre-existing skill clusters or competence 
agglomerations.  Thus credible exit threats have become much less important than they might 
be in non-advanced economies. It is therefore not obvious that the political power of advanced 
capitalist companies has increased in recent decades.  
3.2  At the end of reading Piketty’s book I am not sure what his basic position on the political 
power of advanced capitalism is.  It is surely not accidental that his language and style evokes 
Marx: The title of the German translation is Das Kapital im 21ste Jahrhundert;  he talks of three  
fundamental laws of capitalism; the third (that r > g holds empirically over very long periods) 
he describes as the ‘central contradiction of capitalism’.   
But taking the book at face value, Piketty argues no more than that the ratio of wealth to output 
has risen in recent decades, as a result of a process of accumulation described by r > g. (Though, 
as suggested in 2.4 that seems not to have happened, with the wealth increase taking the form of 
house price increases.)  
If Piketty’s focus is just on the increase in β, without a wider political economic framework 
bringing in technological regimes, he can say little about why other dimensions of inequality 
have grown dramatically over recent decades.  This is especially so at the low end of the income 
spectrum. To this needs to be added the rise in the share of profits in output, α, which as 
suggested in 2.5, his model appears not to explain. If β has also not risen, at least in the relevant 
sense of business capital, the reader is left with how the rise in house prices is then responsible 
for the increase in all the other dimensions of inequality during the great reversal. Although the 
title of another recent publication, Capital is Back, (Piketty and Zucman 2014), is suggestive the 
political power of capital in recent decades is not discussed. 
Piketty probably wisely desists from clear political positions and prognoses – at least which go 
beyond his model. He gives the impression that democracy has been captured by capital – he 
states the need to reprendre la democratie.  But to go beyond his mathematical model he needs 
a political economic framework, which despite his protestations to the contrary he does not 
provide.  
I believe it is not so easy to argue that the political power of capital has increased.  And in setting 
out a simple comparative political economic analysis here, I suggest that many of our current 
problems of inequality in the advanced world are the consequence of democratic political 
systems in which decisive voters are unwillingly to redistribute resources to those lower down 
the income distribution.  Capital in the Twenty-First Century paints, I believe misleadingly, a 
very different picture.  
 
 
4  Rethinking growth pessimism 
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I want finally to close by asking whether Piketty’s growth pessimism in coming decades is 
justified.  A major basis for the striking, even apocalyptic, prediction of future decades which 
Piketty makes, is his view that slow growth is here to stay.  As argued in 2.3 it is not evident to 
me that his prediction – of the inexorable growth of β – is correct even if slow growth remains. 
But the extraordinary success of the book rests on the pessimism he has (brilliantly) conveyed 
about the contemporary world. Should we be pessimistic about continuing low growth? 
There are three points which it is worth making: 
First, (as I read the book) he relies heavily on the analysis of just one economist, Robert Gordon, 
for his prediction of low growth in the future. There is no question that Gordon is not a fine 
empirical economist. And his approach of basing future prediction on a good understanding of 
the past and present is one I am in close sympathy with – in opposition to a rational 
expectations approach which often puts quite unrealistic requirements on the common 
knowledge of the future attributed to current decision-makers. 
Without question, the financial crisis has had and will continue to have sluggish effects on 
growth over the next decade.  The ‘great recession’ has provided fertile soil for the pessimism of 
Capital in the Twenty First Century. But the ICT revolution, ushering in the most important 
new general purpose technology since electricity, may constitute an historical break point.  
(Faraday’s electromagnetic motor was invented in 1821, yet it took many decades of related 
innovations and the establishment of coordinating institutions before electricity began to reflect 
in enhanced productivity growth.) Exactly how this will develop is not predictable, but while 
there are references to it in Piketty, it plays (as I see it) virtually no role in his argument.  A 
useful point of entry into this literature as an antidote to Piketty’s pessimistic position is The 
Second Machine Age by Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2013). 
Piketty also neglects the great changes in growth theory which have taken place in the last two 
decades. While it has long been accepted that most productivity growth has come from 
technological change, it was until relatively recently treated as its residual explanation in 
empirical applications of growth models after the effects of greater capital intensity had been 
taken account of.  Contemporary growth theory, to which Acemoglu and Aghion are perhaps the 
most important contributors, is now centred on the active modelling of innovation (Aghion and 
Howitt 1997, Acemoglu 2009, Aghion and Howitt 2009). It is difficult not to see the importance 
given to innovation in modern growth theory as reflecting the major developing changes in the 
importance of innovation in growth which the ICT revolution has brought about.  Rognlie 
provides some interesting suggestions about how this can be related to Piketty’s work (Rognlie 
2014).  
**** 
So, in conclusion: There is no question of the extraordinary importance of Piketty’s work over 
many years in data collection on wealth.  Nor is there of the compelling force of this lucidly-
written and fascinating book from which I have learned a great amount.  My criticisms in this 
review essay cover solely his analysis of the second half of the last century and the present. His 
neo-classical mathematical apparatus of three fundamental laws – however brilliant in its 
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simplicity – does not provide a good account of capitalist development. To understand why 
inequality has grown so sharply in its many dimensions in this period a serious political 
economic framework is needed in place of Piketty’s mechanical model.  
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